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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the case
below.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Craig Mecham and John Hedman brought suit against
Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson, his wife, to recover $3,275.42, plus costs and interest for breach
of contract.

Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson counter-

claimed against Craig Mecham and John Hedman for fraudulently selling them the mobile home which was represented
to be:
a.

new when it was used;

b.

it was represented never to have been wrecked,

when in truth and in fact, it had been wrecked in that
the mobile home had been blown over in a wind storm;
c.

that the mobile home was rampant with latent

defects;
d.

in addition thereto, the contract had been

unlawfully filled in, and the Bensons were fraudulently
charged a $32,137.12 finance charge which resulted
in the Bensons pay $60,497.12 for a $27,000.00 mobile
home on which the unpaid balance was $19,600.00.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Case was tried before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, District Judge, sitting

with~

Jury.

The

. t in
· favor of the
Jury unanimously rendered a ver d1c
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defendants and against the plaintiffs as follows:
a.

No cause of action on plaintiffs' Complaint.

b.

And a verdict of:

"We, the jurors impaneled in the above-entitled
case find on defendants' Counterclaim, the issues
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs,
and award the following damages:
compensatory damages,
$7,400.00; punitive damages, $000.00; attorney fees
~1,680.00.
'
c.

Plaintiffs' Motion for a new trial was sub-

sequently denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson seek to have
the Jury verdict affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In view of the fact that plaintiffs' Statement
of Facts is not completely correct, Myron L. Benson
and Ellen Benson, his wife, deem it helpful to restate
the facts.
On the 29th day of October, 1975, the plaintiffs
did come to Myron L. Benson and Ellen Benson, his wife,
and represent that they had for sale a

~

1974 Silver-

crest Chalet mobile home, serial number WS-747-X4,
and that they would sell the mobile home to the Bensons
for the sum of $27,000.00.

Mecham and Hedman did

represent to the Bensons that the mobile home was a
new home; that said mobile home had never been wrecked
or blown over, when in truth and in fact,
wrecked and it had been blown over.

it had been

It was further

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

represented by Mecham and Hedman that upon the Bensons
paying a cash down payment of $7,400.00, that the
unpaid balance of

~19,600.00

would be financed at the

rate of eight and one-half per cent (8!%).

That

Craig Mecham did unlawfully and fraudulently change
the interest rate and fill in the contract a rate
which was not agreed upon, to-wit:

an add-on rate of

thirteen and six-tenths per cent (13.6%) (TR-266),
that this unauthorized interest rate resulted in the
Bensons being charged $60,197.12 for a $27,000.00
mobile home which at the closing of the contract only
had an unpaid cash balance price of $19,600.00 (TR-266)
( TR-305).
In addition to the foregoing fraudulent acts,
the Bensons allegeq in their Counterclaim, and further
alleged that the mobile home was full of latent defects
by reason of it having been wrecked in a wind storm
(TR-313).

These defects included the following proven

facts:
a.

the mobile home could not be leveled (TR-306);

b.

the roof leaked (TR-306);

c.

the appliances were defective (TR-306);
(TR-327);
the wall subsequently cracked
(TR-326);
the cabinets were not square
(TR-327).
the doors would not close

d.
e.
f.

That by reason of the foregoing unlawful acts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of fraud that had been perpetuated

upon the Bensons

by Mecham and Hedman, the Bensons did lose the equity
in their trade in family home for which they had been
given a down payment credit of $7,400.00.

In addition

thereto, the Bensons did further suffer damages of
$1,680.00 for attorney fees which Mecham and Hedman
stipulated in Open Court was fair and reasonable (the
Jury adopted their stipulation) (TR-293).
The installment sale and security agreement (see
P-1) was executed by Craig Mecham, personally, and
showed Majestic Mobile Homes as sellor.

An alleged

copy of (P-1) installment sale (see D-9) and security
agreement was delivered to the Bensons some months
after the sale was such that you could not read the
finance charge (TR-267), nor the percentage rate (TR-268),
nor could you read the number of the monthly payments
or monthly installments (TR-268).

In addition thereto,

the payment schedule, and the deferred payment price
were illegible.
Plaintiffs admit and allege that Craig Mecham and
John Hedman both sued in their personal capacity.

The

Bensons in their Counterclaim (see paragraph 8) allege:
Majestic Homes, Inc., was the alter ego of Craig
Mecham and John Hedman and because they operated under
an alter ego, and beca~se they have brought a Complaint
herein in their own name, they are estopped from asserting any defense on behalf of the corporation; also that
any Judgment that is rendered herein will be rendered
personally against the plaintiffs, and any acts of
Majestic Homes, Inc., are binding upon Craig Mecham and
John Hedman, personally (TR-37).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendants generally deny paragraph 8 as aforesaid, so,
the following Demand for Admission was submitted (TR-56):
7. Admit or deny that Craig Mecham and John
Hedman are both bound individually and as a corporation on the contract and agreement sued upon herein.
ANSWER: ADMITTED (see TR-56).
10. Admit or deny that Majestic Homes, Inc.,
has no interest whatever in the contract sued upon
herein between plaintiffs and defendants.
ANSWER: ADMITTED.
The foregoing admissions are made under oath before
a Notary Public on the 11th day of October, 1977 (TR-56).
POINT I
APPELLANTS CRAIG MECHAM AND JOHN HEDMAN ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE.
POINT II
MYRON L. BENSON'S AND ELLEN BENSON'S, RESPONDENT'S,
COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT BARRED BY THE CONTRACTS' EXPRESS
PROVISIONS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS CRAIG MECHAM AND JOHN HEDMAN ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE.
Mecham and Hedman for the first time on appeal
assert as their first point in argument that:
"They are not liable for claim brought against
them as agents of Majestic Homes, Inc."
This assertion is shocking in that during sixteen
months of litigation; 223 pages of Court pleadings
and documents; two days Of trl.al by Jury which included
Mecham and Hedman have always
133 Sponsored
pagesby the
ofS.J. evidence.
Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

maintained that they are the real parties in interest
and that they are both bound individually on the contract
and agreement sued upon herein (TR-56).
Craig Mecham and John Hedman commenced this action
via a Complaint and Summons filed March 3, 1977, in
which they personally, as plaintiffs, allege:
a.

(see paragraph 2) (TR-2) That defendants on

or about the 29th day of October, 1975, entered into
a contract with plaintiffs for the purchase of a

* * * new 1974 Silvercrest Chalet mobile home * * *
b.

(see also paragraph 4) (TR-2) That the plain-

tiffs in accordance with their rights and duties under
said contract

* * *

On April 20, 1977, an Amended Complaint was filed
(TR-8) in which the above allegations were again set
forth re-affirming the fact that Mecham and Hedman
were the real parties in interest.
Defendants both in their Counterclaim and in their
Answer alleged that Mecham and Hedman were personally
liable (TR-37) (TR-50).

The issue was squarely put

before the Court.
The issue was settled once and for all on October 11,
1977, when Craig Mecham and John Hedman under oath
made the following admission (TR-56):
7. Admit or deny that Craig Mecham and John
Hedman are both bound individually and as a corporation

-6-
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on the contract and agreement sued upon herein
ANSWER: ADMITTED.
.
10. Admit or deny that Majestic Mobile Homes
Incorporated, has no interest whatsoever in the co~
tract sued upon herein between the plaintiffs and
defendants.
ANSWER: ADMITTED (TR-56).
STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
CRAIG MECHAM, and JOHN HEDMAN, being first duly
sworn on oath deposes and says: That he is the Plaintiff
in the above entitled action. That he has read and
executed the foreoing answers and that he knows the
contents therein to be true to the best of his knowlege
and belief.
/s/ CRAIG W. MECHAM
/s/ JOHN S. HEDMAN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 11th day
of October, 1977.
/s/ SHIRELY J. MITCHELL
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
Residing at: Salt
March 26, 1980
Lake City
All pleadings; all interrogatories; and all admissions
represented that Mecham and Hedman had sued personally
and were personally liable.

As late as November 30,

1977, plaintiffs represented to the Court in a brief
in support of a Summary Judgment the following undisputed
Facts ( TR-69) :
1. On October 16, 1975, defendants entered into
an agreement with plaintiffs * * * copy of which is
annexed hereto.
2. At that time, plaintiffs were doing business
as Majestic Mobile Homes, Incorporated, now a defunct
Utah Corporation.
3. October 29, 1975--Defendants entered into
the contract for sale with plaintiffs entitled installment sale and security agreement--annexed hereto-WHEREBY PLAINTIFFS AGREED TO SELL AND DEFENDANTS AGREED.
-7-
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TO BUY THE AFORESAID MOBILE HOME.
Plaintiffs (TR-70) then set forth:

Issues to

be resolved!!
Ten issues are set forth--none of which included
or mentioned plaintiffs' Point I, to-wit:
"Appellants are not liable for claims brought
against them as agents of Majestic Homes, Inc."
Plaintiffs throughout have claimed all the benefits
of the Contract, including attorney fees (P-1) (also
see TR-145, TR-67 to and including TR-70), in which
Steven F. Alder, plaintiffs' attorney testified, stipulated, and agreed that under the contract, Mecham and
Hedman were entitled to $1,680.00 should they prevail.
THE COURT: Let me explain the significance of
that stipulation. Ladies and Gentlemen, that means
that the parties have agreed between them that on
the issue of attorney fees the sum of sixteen hundred
and eighty dollars is a reasonable fee to be awarded
the prevailing party in this matter (TR-293).
(P-1) was signed by Craig Mecham personally.
No corporation was mentioned therein.

In accordance

with Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs
and their attorney, by their Complaint and subsequent
pleadings, represented to the Court that Craig Mecham
and John Hedman were the real parties in interest.
It has long been the rule of this Court: "That
a matter not raised at the trial Court could not be
raised on appeal."

See Edgar v. Wagner 572 Pac. 2nd 405;
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see also First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Utah
State University 544 P. 2nd 887 which involved a similar
situation this Court citing Davis v. Mulholland
25 Utah 2nd 56; 475 P. 2nd 834 (1970) held:

"Ordinarily

an appellant cannot raise a theory on appeal for the
first time different from that presented to the Court
below."

See also 5 Am. Jur. 2nd appeal and error

Sec. 546; Pettingill v. Perkins 2 Utah 2nd 26; 272 P.
2nd 185.
Plaintiffs sued personally.

The case was tried

by plaintiffs on the theory that they were bound individually and as a corporation by virtue of the contract (P-1) sued upon herein.

Having by their own

pleadings, evidence and instructions tried and rested
the case on the theory that Mecham and Hedman are the
real parties in interest; they are personally liable
and bound by their own theory.

Plaintiffs cannot on

appeal shift their theory and position.

See Pettingill

v. Perkins, supra 2 Utah 2nd 266-269.
POINT II
MYRON L. BENSON'S AND ELLEN BENSON'S, RESPONDENT'S,
COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT BARRED BY THE CONTRACTS' EXPRESS
PROVISIONS.
As a matter of law, respondents' Counterclaim was
not barred by the contracts' express provisions and
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and by failure to give notice of rejection.
On September 8, 1977, the Bensons filed a Counterclaim alleging:
a.

Fraudulent alteration of contract with regard

to interest rates, finance charge; number of monthly
installments; deferred payment price.
b.

Fraudulent misrepresentations:

1.

That mobile home was

~

when plaintiffs knew

it had been used as a demonstrator.
2.

That mobile home had not been wrecked when

in truth and in fact it had been blown over and wrecked
in a wind storm (TR-313).
3.

Home could not be leveled.

4.

Doors were not squared; roof leaked; appliances

were defective; appliances were not new, but were used.
5.

Walls cracked; cabinets were not square (TR-40).

After proper motion and hearing the Counterclaim was
ordered filed by the Court (TR-52).
Plaintiffs Craig Mecham and John Hedman replied
to Counterclaim as follows:
1.

Admits paragraph one (residency).

2.

Denies paragraphs two through eight.

Thus the issues were framed.

On proper trial and

after proper instructions were given, the matter was
submitted to a Jury.

The Jury found the issues in
-10-
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favor of defendants on their Counterclaim.
Now for the first time on appeal, plaintiffs
claim that Counterclaim was barred by express provisions of the contract by failure of respondents to
give notice of rejection.
The Bensons' Counterclaim was ordered filed by
the Court.

Plaintiffs, generally denied all allega-

tions with the exception of residency.

Defendants'

specific allegations of fraud were put in issue.
Plaintiffs, for the first time since the filing of
the action, have now attempted to assert a new issue
of rejection.
trial.

This issue was never mentioned at the

The plaintiffs offered no instructions to the

Court on this issue, and although the plaintiffs mention it in their' Second Point, they cite no cases nor
any facts in support thereof.
In regard to plaintiffs' allegation that the
Complaint was barred by the express provisions of the
contract, the Court's attention is called to the fact
that the issue of fraud was pled with particularity,
proven by clear and convincing evidence submitted to
the Jury on proper instructions.

After weighing the

evidence, the Jury found that the Bensons' allegations
of fraud were proven by clear and convincing evidence,
and rendered a verdict accordingly.
-11-

The only real
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disputed fact that was placed before the Jury was
whether or not the plaintiffs gave the defendants a
Xerox copy of plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.

The defendants

testified that the only contract that they received
was defendants' Exhibit 9.

A cursory comparison of

(P-1) and (D-9) will indicate that the Jury's verdict
was correct in that (D-9) substantiates defendants'
position that the finance charge; annual percentage
rate; payment schedule; and deferred payment price
were absent from defendants' copy of the contract.
The evidence clearly shows that (D-9) was not delivered to the defendants for some months after the sale
was completed by reason of the fact that all contracts
were sent to the bank and the bank mailed defendants'
copy (D-9) to them with the payment book.

Defendants

honestly believed that the original contract had been
filled in properly at the proper rate of interest,
and upon learning that they were being charged 13.6%
instead of the agreed
contract.

Si%, promptly repudiated the

Craig Mecham acknowledged on cross-examin-

ation that the add-on rate of 13.6% was different than
the

Si% which had been represented to the defendants

(TR-266) (TR-305).
The other issues of fraud properly submitted and
resolved by the Jury and complained of in plaintiffs'
brief were as follows:

Craig Mecham, on cross-exam-

ination, denied that the mobile home had ever been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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blown over and wrecked.

Howard Maki, a security guard

of Mr. Hedman and Mr. Mecham, testified that when
they brought in the mobile home in thre~ (3) sections,
the wind blew the middle section over (TR-311).

The

testimony of the security guard was never rebutted
or questioned.

The evidence is clear that the mobile

home was then repaired and sold to the Bensons as a
new home (see P-1, top left-hand corner, where in Craig
Mecham's handwriting "new" was written in, on the 29th
of October, 1975).

In view of this testimony, the

Bensons testimony, that the house could not be leveled;
the cabinets were crooked; that the roof leaked; that
the walls and doors could not be squared, certainly
amounted to clear and convincing evidence upon which
the Jury could fact their verdict.
Defendants did not deny that they inspected the
mobile home prior to purchasing it.

In this regard,

plaintiffs admit that the mobile home had been set
up, prepared, and placed on the lot for sale.

In

light of this, it could be reasonably assumed that the
defects were covered over and patched up and concealed
so that a reasonable prudent person could not and
would not see them on a reasonable inspection.

It

wasn't until after the home was bought and after several
attempts to level the mobile home and correct certain
items, that the defects came to light.

This evidence

was presented to the Jury, and the Jury found by clear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and convincing facts that the Bensons had been defrauded.
The defendants', the Bensons', Counterclaim was
stated with reasonable certainty and clarity, the
plaintiffs had ample notice of what they were obligated
to meet.

The issue was actually tried in all respect

under these facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs
should be precluded from complaining about it.
The plaintiffs, for the first time on appeal,
allege in their brief that Section 70A-2-606 (1 UCA)
and Section 70A-2-607 (C) as a matter of law, barred
defendants' Counterclaim.

Although this matter was

argued on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
(which was denied), the issue was never presented to
the trial Court; nor mentioned during the trial;
nor was any such defense asserted upon conclusion of
the evidence--when PLAINTIFFS

MADE THEIR MOTION FOR

A DIRECTED VERDICT. (see TR-348).
The Court's attention is also called to the
fact that when plaintiffs submitted to the Court, their
instructions, numbered 1 through 9 (TR-143 to TR-152),
not one requested instruction was requested concerning
the defense of reasonable notice of rejection.

Nor

did the plaintiffs, throughout the entire trial ever
assert the defense of sellors warranties, which was
concealed on the reverse side of the contract (see
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reverse side of D-9).

At this late date, the plaintiffs,

now on page 6 of their brief, now seek to assert this
defense.

With regard to the provisions concerning

warranties on the reverse side of the contract, plaintiffs now claim that this concealed provision barred
the defendants' right to recover on their Counterclaim.

Concerning this late defense, the Court's

attention is called to the established law of this state.
As is set down in Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales,
557 Pac. 2nd 1009, in which this Court stated:
"SECTION 70A-2-316, UCA 1953, REQUIRES THAT TO
EXCLUDE AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, A
DISCLAIMER MUST BE CONSPICUOUS, I.E. IN LARGER OR CONTRASTING TYPE OR COLOR.

THE REASON FOR THIS PROVISION

IS THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF THE LAW TO LOOK WITH
DISFAVO~UPON

SEMI-CONCEALED OR OBSTRUCTED SELF-PRO-

TECTED PROVISIONS OF A CONTRACT, PREPARED BY ONE PARTY
TO WHICH THE OTHER PARTY IS NOT LIKELY TO NOTICE.

WE THINK IT IS A CORRECTIVE SALUTARY RULE, THAT WHERE
THERE ARE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHARACTER IN A CONTRACT,
EITHER BURIED IN OTHER PROVISIONS, IN FINE PRINT OR
OTHERWISE SEKI-CONCEALED, OR SECRETED IN SOME MANNER,
SUCH AS BEING FOUND ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE BACK
SIDE OF THE DOCUMENT.

THEY SHOULD NOT BE BINDING

UPON THE SIGNER (BUYER), UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE
PROVISION WAS ACTUALLY CALLED TO HIS ATTENTION."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court will note that the installment sale and
security agreement, on its face, makes no reference
to merchantability.

The actual disclaimer is placed

on the back among other fine print provisions (see
D-9).
Under the law and doctrine set forth and prescribed
in Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, supra, Craig
Mecham and John Hedman should not be permitted to insist that this concealed provision be effective as
a waiver (see also Seal v. TAYCO, Inc., 16 Utah 2nd 323,
400 Pac. 2nd 503).
Although Section 70A-2-607 (3A, UCA 1953) was neither presented, argued, or asserted during the trial
or in plaintiffs' Motion for Directed Verdict, the
plaintiffs now seek to urge this defense on appeal.
In this regard, the Court's attention is called to
Craig Mecham's testimony (TR-262), in which he admitted
that he guaranteed and warranted the home to be fit
for the purpose for which it was sold.

He also told

them that it was a nice, beautiful, livable home, and
that if they had any problems with it, he would fix
them, maintain them, and take care of them.

It was

further admitted that several attempts were made to
patch up the defects.

As was previuosly stated, the

contract (D-9) was not mailed out to the Bensons for
several months, this coupled with the fact that they
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(the Bensons) firmly believed they were doing business
with respectable, honest people, and it was not until
they obtained a copy of (P-1) from the State Tax Commission that they became aware of the fact that the interest rates had been changed; and upon further learning
that the house had been wrecked and blown over in a
wind storm and was incapable of being repaired; that the
Bensons promptly brought suit herein.

There was no

_showing at the trial by the plaintiffs that the Bensons
failed to act within a reasonable time.

On the contrary,

the plaintiffs, in their brief, failed to analyze the
evidence in the light favorable to plaintiffs' contention, as it should be by reason of the Jury verdict.
In Christopher v. Larson for Sales, supra, this Court
stated that what constituted a reasonable time for
return and request for recision under the statute,
quoted above, it is usually a question of fact to be
determined from the circumstances in each case; and
a finding thereon is subject to the standard rule of
review which will not be upset if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to sustain it.
The plaintiffs tendered no instructions, no interrogatories, nor did they at any time throughout the
trial claim that the Bensons failed to act within a
reasonable time.

On the contrary, the evidence shows

that the defendants' delays were the result of the
-17-
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plaintiffs' failure to deliver to them a readable contract and their further attempts to patch up a windblmm. mobile home that was rampant with latent defects
(see instruction 13) (TR-166).
CONCLUSION
The above-entitled cause was tried and submitted
to the jury on the basis of a written contract, for
and on behalf of the plaintiff, and on the basis of
fraud, by reason of the Counterclaim of the defendant.
These issues were submitted to the jury after the
Court had instructed the Jury on each and all of the
necessary elements of fraud, and more particularly:
The defendants' requirement of proving fraud by clear
and convincing evidence.

The Jury accepted the defen-

dants' version and found that the representations
were material to the transaction, and that they were
false and fraudulent as to the defendants.

The defen-

dants respectfully urge the Court to sustain Jury's
verdict in that it is amply supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
Respectfully submitted,

~~ffeD~
and Respondents
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